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STUDIES, c. 1970–1991: THE MAKING OF Voix ÉrythrÉe 
Olufemi A. AKINOLA
Department of Local Government Studies, obafemi Awolowo University 
ABSTRACT   This essay explores the nuances of identity construction in Eritrea from about 
1970 to 1991. Thirty years of war (from 1961 to 1991) left Eritrea with a legacy of images 
and their interpreters on the world stage. Less well known, however, is that Eritrea’s would-
be interpreters only joined in the rebellion after its first decade. While they helped reinvent 
Eritrea and expand Western support for the war, their actions also fueled new conflicts at 
home, as some identities had to be filtered, discounted, or displaced. Embodying this process 
is voix Érythrée, the view of nation making that prevailed at the end of the war. The essay 
examines how voix Érythrée took shape in the 1970s and 1980s, the individuals who formed 
the coalition of insurgent leaders and foot soldiers that nurtured the transformations, and how 
information about Eritrea in Western journals changed from a trickle to a flood. It also dis-
cusses major shifts in loyalties in Eritrea, how such shifts fed into the construction and appeal 
of liberationist discourse, and the building blocks of the field of Eritrean studies. 
Key Words: Elite-mass relations; Liberation fronts; National identity construction; Shifting 
loyalties; Voix Érythrée.(1)
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous images have been applied to modern Eritrea. For decades prior 
to the 1980s, the Red Sea territory had been represented variously as a long-
imagined but unconsummated regnum; as a “proving ground” of colonizers’ 
illusions; as Ethiopia’s most implacable province; and as the theatre of “the 
loneliest war” waged by “the world’s most sophisticated guerrilla fighting force” 
(Kaplan, 1988: 58, 59). The war ended in 1991, and independent Eritrea became 
a new oasis of peace in a conflict-ridden region (Connell, 1994; cf. Pateman, 
1991c). Some of these constructs speak to Eritrea’s place as an entrêpot in a 
region located at the crossroads of identities. Other images have emerged within 
the same frame of time, since at least the 1940s. However, most have been 
preferred imaginations of Eritrea writ large on the world stage, designed to 
build up off-shore support for Eritrea far more than to shed light on conditions 
within it. Scholars have also been loath to engage with the internal politics of 
Eritrean identity construction as well as the nuances of its dominant discourses. 
Investigations free from war-related pressure have been rarer still.(2) 
To fill some of these gaps, this article examines the phases and changes in 
representations of Eritrea in the two decades since approximately 1970. I draw 
on a close reading of the literature and my fieldwork in Eritrea, which explored 
the web of identities and images upon which modern Eritrea rests and how 
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these images and identities have fed into domestic politics and changed over 
time. I discuss how some of these identities were filtered, discounted, displaced, 
or re-invented as the insurgent campaign evolved, and how such shifts affected 
loyalties within Eritrea as well as the reach of the insurgent campaign. I also 
point out critical gaps in the large body of literature that has since formed 
the core of Eritrean studies, comment on specific conceptual and analytical 
contributions to the debate, and outline some implications of Eritrea’s successes 
in the intellectual sphere. First, however, I note the essay’s limits. 
BACKGROUND
Some might ask what a survey study can add to a discussion of the social 
experiments of insurgent Eritrea that can now draw on, and reinforce, a full-
fledged state. Is this essay a mere storyteller’s impulse? Do hindsight and the 
apparent fit between theory and praxis make revisionism so attractive as to be 
unavoidable? My retort to the latter offers a window on the former. Eritrea’s 
“small war” spawned a huge debate, and it is worthwhile to bring together 
the associated literature as well as to revisit some of the issues. With Eritrea’s 
successes came the burdens that remain today. We must reappraise some of 
what has been assumed, in thought and practice, in light of Eritrea’s changed 
circumstances, filling the lacunae made imperative by warfare but also without 
merely repeating already existent work. 
What follows, then, is not so much a discussion of the Eritrean insurgency 
or the nationalist ferment that informed it, but a commentary on the discourse 
generated by both issues in the 1970s and 1980s. I do not intend to cover the 
entire large body of literature on this period. For example, I do not specifically 
explore Ethiopian counterpoints to the Eritrea debate (e.g. Erlich, 1983), as such 
discussions would divert the focus of this essay. My goal is modest; by a criti-
cal interpretive survey of the literature, I seek to shed some new light on how 
social facts were constructed, acted upon, refined, and projected in the pursuit 
of Eritrean nation-making approximately from 1970 to 1991. I set the terminal 
date at 1991 for two main reasons. First, the end of hostilities in May of that 
year not only opened opportunities for new forms of public engagement. It lent 
fresh authenticity to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the faction 
that won in the round of fighting among the nationalists that began in the 
late 1970s, and took control of all of insurgent Eritrea in 1981. Second, some 
issues related to contestation of the EPLF regime have deep roots that were 
sure to re-arise once the cloud of war had passed. Thus, identity construction in 
post-1991 Eritrea is surely modifying these old structures in new and unfolding 
contexts. Discussion of these issues deserves a separate essay.
This essay has two main focuses. First, I synthesize and discuss some of 
the themes and attributes of discourses during the wholesale “re-definition” of 
Eritrea. Second, I explore how politics, polemics, and epistemes blend (or had 
been mixed) in the historiography. Central to both tasks is the need to highlight 
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issues that have been ignored or discarded because (or in spite) of the splits 
in nationalist ranks. This approach should not only unearth some of the latent 
assumptions of memory and discourse, but also close the gaps between these 
assumptions and the history of the Eritrea campaign. 
Nationalism has had a long and winding history in Eritrea, where protracted 
encounters with external interests have sown and sprouted nationalist seeds. 
Italian colonial rule (1890–1941) brought an anti-colonial phase of nationalism 
that resembled those in various other colonial locales. However, after WWII, 
a mix of Allied Powers maneuvering and local discontent brought forth new, 
ominous sprouts. The United Nations (UN) intervened, helping to dispose of 
Eritrea by making it Ethiopia’s fourteenth province. This “federal solution” was 
doomed to failure. It fell short of Ethiopia’s quest for a full merger and did not 
match the wishes of many Eritreans. As Duncan Cumming, Chief Administrator 
of Eritrea in the last year of British rule (1951–1952), wrote: 
None of the Eritrean political parties had previously proposed federation 
with Ethiopia, and the federal conception was so foreign to them that 
none of the vernacular languages of the country contained a word which 
accurately conveyed its meaning. (Cumming, 1953: 26)
The “federation” no one wished for did garner deep support from some 
Eritreans, dividing Eritrea. On the opposing side, a few militants launched 
armed attacks against Ethiopian symbols in Eritrea’s Moslem lowlands. The first 
shots are believed to have been fired in September 1961. Although the shots 
barely reached beyond the firing range, they had a powerful symbolic impact, 
arousing nationalist passions that would fuel a 30-year armed struggle that 
today looms large in the identity of Eritrea. One decade after the insurgency 
began, its organizational anchor, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), split in 
two. Intense competition and turf wars with the rival EPLF eventually dissi-
pated nationalist energies, with the factions eventually reaching a point of zero-
sum outcomes (Pool, 1983; Markakis, 1987: 109ff.). After defeating the ELF in 
1981, the EPLF dominated the final stages of the campaign as well as the form 
and character of its denouement. This may help explain why much of the lit-
erature on post-1970 Eritrea is replete with romantic images of EPLF, and why 
observers had thought that Eritrea’s independence was certain under the EPLF’s 
watch. The current challenge is to reach beyond idealized notions of Eritrea and 
to bring greater dispassion and rigor to the analysis of its nation-making experi-
ence. In both cases, some of the categories employed in the Eritrea debate must 
be deconstructed. 
For example, the established axiom is that a composite Eritrean identity 
emerged (or to borrow from Cliffe [1989], was “forged”) from war-induced 
hardship. However, the facts also suggest a variegated and multi-layered under-
lying discourse. Until the late 1960s, Western-style intellectual engagement with 
the Eritrean insurgency was fleeting; subsequent intensified guerilla activity and 
the founding of the EPLF brought expanded commentary, fueling and fueled 
50 O.A. AKINOLA
by a huge knowledge-production program. The latter brought forth a body of 
thought, symbols, and narratives on Eritrean nationalism. Some have depicted 
this body as an organic whole, or the cultural as well as the historical fountain 
from which all Eritreans have drank and will drink, irrespective of their social 
background, vocation, or idiosyncrasy. But others have seen the corpus in its 
elements, as particular or social constructions of Eritrea’s past and future that 
are open to sharply divergent interpretations (Harnet, 1983/1984; Araya, 1990; 
Woldemikael, 1993). 
Identity paradigms can spark contention in conditions of rapid and/or funda-
mental change. Every social revolution needs its own history, symbols, and ritu-
als, all of which must be abstracted from conflicting interests and experiences 
(cf. Kaschuba, 2000). In these terms, Eritrea’s universes are partial: “they reflect 
only part of the total experiences of [Eritreans] and they are filtered by the 
subjective processes of self-selection” (Hodder-Williams, 1989: 197). Despite this 
partiality, Eritrean discourses closely approximate what Farley (1996: 4) called 
“pure presence: [a] … total, comprehensive, unambiguous presencing of reality.” 
Thus, although a plurality of primordial views, interests, and meanings is read-
ily acknowledged, the quest for “an utterly perfect, transparently true version of 
[Eritrean] history” (Farley, 1996: 9) has long been an overriding article of faith. 
Decades after the flawed “federation” experienced troubles, Eritrean intellectuals 
had yet to come to terms with some of its basics. Tekle (1964) argued that 
Eritrea’s natural home was in Ethiopia. Yohannes (1987) agreed with Cumming 
(1953) that no one had wanted a “federation,” but Araya (1990: 87, 90, 94) 
suggested this meant that local forces had no control over their own history. 
Negash (1997) reopened the debate, prompting Fessehatzion (1997, 1998; cf. 
Markakis, 1998) to caricature “the ‘federal experience’ that never was.” 
Here lies the origin of what I call voix Érythrée, a uniform and unitary 
depiction of Eritrean identity and the nationalist agenda that has been 
predominant since c.1978. As argued below, voix Érythrée was not founded 
on free-flowing debate; it has thrived on discourses essentialized in either-or, 
we-they terms. Heterodoxy was not highly valued; hence, viewpoints contrary 
to the prevailing official thinking or arguments on its margins were consistently 
spurned, discounted, de-legitimized, or demonized. Knowledge claims and 
identity parameters were also moved back and forth between their micro- (or 
sub-group) foundations, on the one hand, and macro- (or inclusive) contexts 
and meanings on the other. All this made it relatively easy for dominant groups 
to claim that their ideas applied across the social spectrum. However, nearly 
all groups tended to keep away from debate on the constitution of the Eritrean 
national self. A doctrinaire bias against dialogue thus appears to be deeply 
ingrained in the political culture.
A few illustrations help clarify this point. For much of the period under 
review, the ELF and EPLF (and relations between them) were presented as 
mutually exclusive and apolitical. This shielded leaders and their choices from 
criticism as it rejected partisan politics, denied that change agents ultimately are 
self-interested actors,(3) and repudiated basic continuities in ELF and EPLF per-
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sonas, as well as experiences. Above all, such claims made contrived processes 
seem inevitable and immanent. Thus, in their essences, Eritrean nationalist 
thought and praxis was long bound to “rites of power” (Kertzer, 1988). As of 
1991, Eritrea appeared far more inclined to savor its new status than to face up 
to some of the burdens of its most recent past. A case in point is the response 
to Ethiopia’s legacy in Eritrea. 
Ethiopian presence in Eritrea is a complex subject, and its legacies are 
certainly not yet cast in stone. As of mid-1991, much still depended on what 
Eritrea made – or failed to make – of what Iyob (1993; 1995: 26–28) has 
called Ethiopia’s “regime of truth.” This refers to a corpus of historical and 
other constructs from which Addis Ababa had defined its own role in the Horn 
region and hence its place in Eritrea. Politicians as well as scholars have long 
cherry-picked constructs; those on the ideological right grounded Ethiopia’s “big 
brother” role in myth and antiquity, while those on the left trained their sights 
on colonialism, capitalism, and self-determination. The whole range of views 
found voice among Eritreans; but a shift to the left in the late 1970s saw 
Eritrea share a common cause with radicals in Ethiopia. Some would claim that 
the EPLF helped found the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the militia 
based in the north that would dominate the government in post-1991 Ethiopia. 
Others have seen the EPLF as nothing more than an arm of the Ethiopian 
Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP). 
A series of setbacks in the 1980s dimmed the power of Ethiopia as a “big 
neighbor.” By 1991, the political value of its “regime of truth” had dipped even 
lower. As Iyob (1993) has illustrated, the denouement of Eritrea’s campaign 
reflected the myths of Africa’s founding fathers, the boundaries that they 
inherited in the 1960s, and the very essence of the “state” shown by map 
boundaries. The problem, though, was that Ethiopia’s “regime of truth” reached 
much deeper. It extended to how Eritreans imagined one another and how they 
related with the EPLF, the ELF, and Ethiopia. Thus, the changes necessary for 
a free Eritrea could have originated at home. But did they? 
The complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay, but 
two points are worth making. First, “extroversion” had some appeal to the 
EPLF. A hobbled Ethiopia not only offered much to pick and choose from; 
its strategic role of regional hegemon could also be up for grabs. Strategists 
in Asmara never quite stated this as an official policy goal, but, still, fears of 
chaos in Ethiopia, its effects on the region, and the role(s) that Eritrea could 
play in such a scenario encouraged the outside donor community to shy away 
from Eritrea, or to at least show empathy for its positions on the Horn. 
Second, Eritrean residents had rising expectations, but EPLF control was set 
to expand. The local opposition had long been in ruins, its essence suppressed 
as much by war as by internal habits. Few expected it to recover its voice 
or develop a new voice soon. As a result, free Eritrea’s early moves were far 
more interesting for their novelty than for making a real difference. In regional 
and domestic matters, the EPLF was free to set the agenda and its own pace. 
Ethiopia’s “regime of truth” reemerged stealthily, but Eritrea did not readily 
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acknowledge this influence as a major element in the constitution of its “new” 
self. The discursive equilibrium established after the ELF’s unwilling exit one 
decade earlier from the homeland changed little, if at all. 
In the next section, I examine contrasts and continuities in the constructions 
of the Fronts. I also discuss how ELF–EPLF schisms affected, and were in turn 
affected by, the wider Eritrea debate. These factors contributed to the backdrop 
of the reconstitution of the campaign, as examined in previous sections outlines 
changes in the political environment from the early to mid-1970s when the 
insurgency attracted followers from among Eritreans who had long been neutral 
or undecided. Those changes, I shall show, not only marked the rise of voix 
Érythrée at home, but also abroad. The social origins of a bloc of converts 
made the slant of voix Érythrée a fait accompli.
CHARACTERIzING THE FRONTS 
The Eritrea campaign comprised two “wars”: one by the Fronts and the 
other by intellectuals. It is unclear which was the primary war, but battles for 
the hearts and minds of Eritreans were fought in the world at large as well as 
at home. Western-style discourse emerged in the 1970s, close on the heels of 
the founding of the EPLF’s, but at least one decade after the first shots were 
fired.(4) This time lag is both an explanation and an analytic puzzle that can 
shed some light on the campaign’s beginnings. 
For example, the insurgency began with “hit and run skirmishes” (ELF, 1977: 
106) that were largely unknown. At that time, “the ELF comprised only a 
handful of fighters and their military activities reflected their size and rural base 
of operations” (Pool, 1980: 40; 1988: 33; Abir, 1972: 5; Pliny the Middle-aged, 
1978: 37; Markakis, 1988: 55). It is also unclear to what extent the ELF 
realpolitik shaped the perceptions of the campaign around the world. Questions 
remain about the appropriation of the campaign’s initial symbols and payoffs. 
Just how had militant activism in the rural lowlands come to seize all of 
Eritrea? Who had managed the transition from one to the other, and how? 
Some answers can be found in Nehnan elamanan (lit. Our struggle and 
its goals), a manifesto issued anonymously in 1970 but usually attributed to 
Isaias Afeworki, then a rising political star who would become EPLF Secretary 
General. Nehnan elamanan emerged immediately after Addis Ababa’s first 
show of weakness since the beginning of the insurgency and after ELF ranks 
had been rocked by claims of discrimination against Christian recruits from the 
highlands. That Nehnan elamanan spoke up for victims of perceived duplicity 
on the part of the ELF may have lent the manifesto a subtle ethnic slant but 
its critique was transcendent. Partisans of the campaign, the document stated, 
were neither Christians nor Moslems; they were only Eritreans keen to free 
their homeland from all forms of domination. The new supra-religious identity 
construct not only challenged the sitting ELF leadership, which had long relied 
on the Arab world for support; it also afforded new tools for analysis of 
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Eritrea. For some (e.g., Kaplan, 1988), this would make EPLF an exemplar of 
godless materialism and human rights abuses, all of which would turn away 
pro-Western observers, as well as sympathy, until the 1980s. For others, the 
ideological spin-off from the new construct set the EPLF apart from the ELF. 
As of the 1980s, according to Gebre-Medhin (1984: 50), there had been:
two qualitative phases in Eritrean national politics. The first phase 
[began] in 1941 as parliamentary politics developed into the clandestine 
political opposition in the 1950s and [ended] with the beginning of 
armed struggle in 1961. The second phase [began] in 1970 with the 
formation of the EPLF and [matured] in 1977 with the announcement by 
the Front of the National Democratic Programme. 
Gebre-Medhin focused on the “class content” of Eritrea’s independence 
struggle; hence, his categories are drawn more tightly than those by scholars 
such as Bereketeab (2000), which are based on looser criteria. For example, 
the first decade of the insurgency (1961–1970) is missing from Gebre-Medhin’s 
timeline. This lacuna may or may not have been intentional, but it has various 
forms as well as deep significance. Because of such gaps, analyses of Eritrea 
have often failed to directly address questions about the early phase of the 
insurgency, and its implications; instead, they have offered two conceptual- 
analytic strategies. One has been to disentangle what Pool (1998: 23; italics 
added) called “the basic rationale of any armed struggle: military victories” 
from social-institutional engineering. The other strategy has involved a deft 
interpretation of (and/or extrapolation between) the records of the ELF and 
EPLF. Together, both strategies have defined voix Érythrée as a body of 
thought. Wittingly or unwittingly, these approaches have aimed to “capture” 
discursive space for, or on behalf of, the EPLF, and to make the ELF the most 
significant other in liberationist discourse—on a par with, or nearly as external-
ized as, imperial Ethiopia. 
Illustrations are readily available. Gebre-Medhin (1984: 49–50) considered 
the early ELF as a “pre-1961 Eritrean history” redux; through its first decade, 
he argued, the armed struggle did not bring about “a qualitative break in the 
struggle for independence.” Markakis (1987: 116) blamed this failure on “the 
political immaturity and organizational nebulousness of the ELF” during the 
1960s. The views of zemheret Yohannes, an ELF partisan turned EPLF council 
member, are more pointed still.(5) According to Yohannes (Wilson, 1991: 200n),
The experience of the ELF can be divided into two basic stages: first 
1961 to 1970 and second 1970 to 1981. In the first stage the ELF was 
not an organisation in the strict sense… it did not have a democrati-
cally elected leadership, it did not have a clearly drawn political line or 
organisational constitution… After the split in 1970 and the establishment 
of the EPLF, the ruling circle of the ELF were compelled by the new 
development to make political concessions. 
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Yohannes and Gebre-Medhin were not alone in doubting the ELF’s bona 
fides. Sherman (1980: 49–54; 1978; cf. Bhardwaj, 1979) noted that the ELF lost 
the battle for innovative “social programming” and only reacted case-by-case to 
the EPLF. Iyob (1995: 120, 121) argued that the ELF was so “mired in person-
alism, patronage and power struggles” that by the 1970s it had no capacity or 
will to lead. For Bereketeab (2000: 196), this spoke to an unreconstructed ELF 
that embodied too much “spontaneity and preoccupation with military priorities” 
and too little “comprehensive, clearly thought out plan-of-action.” According to 
Tseggai (1988: 76),
The ELF, although created out of a need to preserve the national entity 
of Eritrea, was led by self-styled leaders, residing abroad, whose aim 
was to set-up a neo-colonial state in Eritrea through armed struggle. As 
such, the ELF lacked a clear ideological line, and a political programme 
that could safeguard the interests of the oppressed majority of Eritreans. 
Instead, through its organizational structure and its style of work, the 
ELF fostered religious antagonism and fanned backward differences and 
sentiments, of a regional and ethnic nature…to assert its leadership.
Characterizing the ELF as the once-apparent solution that turned into a major 
obstacle has some merit. Not only did the ELF force a rethinking of center-
periphery relations on Ethiopia (cf. Bell, 1974: 445); its partisans had taken up 
arms against the empire just as Eritrea’s unconditional membership in it seemed 
to be a fait accompli. Instead, the ELF split down the middle, with its founders 
apparently overwhelmed in the aftermath of their initial successes. Still, organi-
zational and philosophical distinctions between the Fronts were more complex 
than shown by dominant accounts. According to Harnet (1983/1984: 10–11; cf. 
Woldemikael, 1991: 35–36; de Waal, 1992: 374), 
Organizationally, the E.L.F. [was] loose and tolerate[d] democratic expres-
sion of opinions; at times this “democratic toleration” [had turned] out 
to be a fertile ground for adventurous, spontaneous movements which 
play[ed] into the hands of rightist and leftist opportunists. The E.P.L.F. 
[was] a solid organization with no democratic rights; it [was] character-
ized by a strict military discipline whose underlying sanction [was] fear 
of ruthless punishment… For the E.P.L.F., the broad masses [were] just 
like clay which [had] to be moulded, willy-nilly, as it [saw] fit. 
Tseggai’s position on “a clear ideological line” is widely shared (cf. Machida, 
1987; Gebre-Medhin, 1989: 172–174; Iyob, 1995: 109–116), but nonetheless 
problematic. It ignores key considerations beyond ELF control during the 1960s, 
such as disparate Arab responses to apparent ideological-strategic shifts within 
the Eritrean nationalist movement in the late 1960s, and Ethiopia’s lobbying 
efforts around the world to isolate ELF leaders-in-exile from rank-and-file 
fighters at home. Also flawed are the links that Tseggai established between 
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ELF leaders’ residence and legitimacy and the organization’s performance. Most 
troubling is Tseggai’s circular argument that EPLF ideological success is the 
one major attribute that the ELF did not have. This reasoning may reflect the 
permissive use of concepts during the insurgency, but it makes the argument 
irrefutable. 
A more realistic position is that ELF activity was affected by EPLF competi-
tion in the ideological realm. As myths and as frameworks of thought and 
action, ideologies can often become frozen as constructed, self-reinforcing “realities,” 
thus creating captive audiences and reducing the opportunity costs of pragmatic 
solutions (cf. Pool, 1980: 45; 1998: 23n; Markakis, 1988: 64–65). The main 
elements of what would become the dominant view emerged during the 1960s; 
yet, how to realize and sustain the dominant view without crushing Eritrea’s 
socio-cultural “heterogeneities” remained a point of contention throughout the 
1970s. In this light, Pool’s (1980: 40) view on “the failure of ELF to transform 
as it expanded” is of limited use.(6) Such arguments in effect blame the ELF for 
not having supplanted itself wholesale. 
More crucial than the ELF itself are the dialectics of being and becom-
ing. Self-transcendence and self-regeneration can be difficult, and were most 
certainly so in insurgent Eritrea, given the near total lack of agreed-upon rules 
and low social capital. In this context, the ELF’s difficulties derived from two 
main sources. The first concerned cognitive as well as structural dissonance at 
the collective organizational level and concurrent pressure for micro-group and 
personal survival within the movement. The second was intense competition 
for power and for ultimate control over the values and strategies of Eritrean 
nationalism. 
There was little room for political maneuvering in this framework. Many 
strategic options that observers have taken for granted post hoc since the 1980s 
did not exist in the same form during the 1960s. It is also unclear whether, 
with a less cloudy horizon, ELF leaders would have considered such options 
politically rational and acceptable (Markakis, 1987: 115; Iyob, 1995: 110). The 
most acclaimed options centered on perceived lapses in early ELF tactics and 
strategies, and on the grip of the “more ideologically self-conscious and radical 
faction” (Young, 1983: 215). Members of this faction gravitated to the EPLF 
and turned it into a formidable military as well as social force; EPLF actions, 
in turn, reinforced well-honed but controversial accounts of ELF decline. One 
question, however, has not been addressed: Why did the intelligentsia not join 
the armed struggle until its second decade? 
The answers lie in ELF-society interfaces, particularly in social constructions 
of religion that tended to align Eritrea’s Western-style intellectuals against the 
ELF. The literature provides two main perspectives on this issue. The first 
emphasizes Eritrea’s record of sectarianism and antagonisms between Muslims 
and Christians during the 1940s that bifurcated politics along these religious 
lines (cf. Ellingson, 1977). Stephen Longrigg, Eritrea’s Chief Administrator in 
1942–44 and author of A Short history of eritrea (1945), took this view. In 
May 1946, shortly after leaving his post, Longrigg (1946: 126) told the Royal 
56 O.A. AKINOLA
Empire Society that in Eritrea, 
(the) Muslim population – half the total, and occupying some seven-
eighths of the land-surface – have no conception … of a united Eritrea, 
and no sense of solidarity with the Christians on the plateau … From 
Ethiopia [the Muslims] are divided by religion, and by memories of 
many brutal slave-raids and cattle-drives in the past. 
Fifty years later, Negash (1997: 150–158) continued to insist that religious 
beliefs had not only underscored Eritrean political praxis through the federation 
period (1952–62), but that social divisions in their wake had provided the 
backdrop for internal strife during the 1970s. 
The second school of thought emphasizes the material bases of inter-group 
relations. Pool (1980; 1983: 175) located such social antagonisms in Eritrea 
in the “differential transformation of a society divided between pastoralist and 
peasant.” Markakis (1988: 52) concurred, noting that while “Muslim pastoralists 
on the lowlands and Christian peasants on the plateau had never been good 
neighbours … the reason was a perennial competition for land, not the differ-
ence in faith.” From this viewpoint, religion has had a far more instrumental 
value as a mask for the competition for mundane rewards. 
No one viewpoint can offer a complete picture. Both of the above views 
include some generalized fear of religious sectarianism and how such sectarian-
ism might affect Eritrea’s multi-faith society. Proponents of bifurcation may 
have overstated their case, but certainly religion has deeply influenced society 
and politics in modern Eritrea. Until the 1970s, confessional differences had 
tended to coincide with geo-ethnic as well as political boundaries (Pool, 1983: 
184–188; Iyob, 1995: 108–135). With roots in the Moslem lowlands, the ELF 
was associated with non-secular politics; in contrast, the EPLF drew its core 
support from the Christian highlands. Although “a majority of its cadres were 
Tigrinya, [the EPLF had] presented a balance between the nationalities and 
religious groups in its leadership” (Cliffe, 1989: 137, 140; cf. Markakis, 1988: 
64; Woldemikael, 1991: 34–35). 
On the other hand, what one might call “ethno-religious balancing” is not 
new. Nor is it original to the EPLF. Cliffe (1989: 134) noted that the “counter-
tradition of non-sectarian politics within Eritrean nationalism” dates back to the 
1940s and was maintained by the ELF. As such, strictly bipolar conceptions 
of Eritrean political life present a false picture. During the 1960s, many in 
the highlands touted historic links with northern Ethiopia. The highlands area 
housed the largest concentration of economic infrastructure in Eritrea and pro-
duced the upper crust of the intelligentsia (cf. Araya, 1990: 95–96). The specific 
geographic interests and characteristics help explain why the first shots against 
imperial rule rang out in the lowlands and why the highlands contained little 
early support for revolt. 
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RECONFIGURING THE STRUGGLE
Eritrea presents clear examples of social conditions and interests that were 
shaped and reshaped by political identities. However, the literature has little to 
say about how competing identity paradigms intertwined with shifts in strategy 
and tactics during the Eritrea campaign. To illustrate, I look at the nuances of 
the production and dissemination of information on the early campaign in the 
West. According to Bell (1974: 429 note): 
There is not now, or likely to be in the immediate future, an authorita-
tive study of the Eritrean insurrection. ELF exiles are not particularly 
knowledgeable, and the shifta(7) are not inclined to written records. The 
Ethiopians generally prefer to discuss other matters and it is doubtful if 
a definitive internal chronicle exists… In general the printed word is the 
result of transient [especially journalistic] exposure to the crisis, often 
excellent but seldom analytical…
Bell dismissed potential ELF discourses in a brief footnote and presented 
a psycho-cultural slant to his views. However, he did foreshadow dyadic 
constructs of Eritrea. For Bell, Eritrea’s was not so much a campaign for 
self-determination as a “protracted insurrection … drifting through cycles of 
violence and quiescence” because it had been “authorized by history and habit” 
(Bell, 1974: 428, 429, 444). Bell conceded that Ethiopia’s ruling elites had long 
expressed impolitic views of “minor” cultures. It is no wonder that Gebre-
Medhin (1976: 54) argued that “endemic insurgency” and similar categories “deny 
the real issues”; in other words, those seeking a clearer understanding must 
look elsewhere. Medhanie (1987; 1989; 1994a) articulated ELF perspectives on 
the struggle, prompting an EPLF rebuttal in at least one case (EPLF Bureau 
of Foreign Relations, 1987). However, the Eritrean view has been that Bell’s 
prognosis was misdirected. 
However, Bell had, in effect, dragged Eritrean nationalism under the looking 
glass. His scathing criticism of ELF also highlighted two important issues. 
First, insider accounts of Eritrea’s armed struggle were rare, and perhaps non-
existent, in the West throughout the 1960s, leading to Bell’s second point that 
Western observers had been slow to grasp the “real issues” or dimensions of 
the conflict. This could have led to greater empathy induced by self-generated 
information. Given conditions in Eritrea in early- to mid-1970s, Bell’s concerns 
also hinted at important distinctions within the nationalist movement, between 
its views and the preferences of its factions, and among the factions. The ELF’s 
crisis was still unfolding, but what organizational form it would take was of 
great importance. Lobban (1976: 314, note 8) argued, for instance, that “the 
ELF position is not as widely known in the [United States, hence] the PLF 
[Popular Liberation Forces, led by Osman Sabbe] is usually thought to be the 
major force.” This and the criticism that trailed Bell’s and Medhanie’s views 
suggest that disaggregated analytic categories do have political credence. 
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Bell’s latent advocacy would soon permeate nationalist thinking. But the 
response would not illuminate the history of the ELF’s struggle; it would 
mold the building blocks of voix Érythrée. From the mid-1970s, the dominant 
discourse emphasized the world’s ignorance, misreading, and/or distortion of 
Eritrea’s national history. It also rejected backward traditions at sub-national 
levels and asserted the virtues of the new, all-inclusive view of the insurgency 
(Gebre-Medhin, 1976). Ironically, converts to the new episteme in effect con-
firmed some of Bell’s claims regarding the ELF. Much of the revalidation was 
circuitous and understated, but it lent new credence to Bell’s views, which had 
drawn criticism from both sides in the Eritrea debate. 
Bell’s analysis differed from the norm in other ways as well. He was much 
less concerned with mischief from outside Eritrea than with considerations 
internal to the nationalist movement. For example, during the 1960s, few 
intellectuals could present the ELF’s cause in terms intelligible outside the 
Arab world. This reflected the deep resistance to Western culture in the society 
from which the ELF had sprung. Reinforced by the radical Arab regimes 
from which it drew support, the ELF wanted to check the creeping influx of 
Westernization; however, this led to a frozen mind-set in which all Westerners 
were “imperialist,” unsympathetic, and not worth courting. Such rigidity made 
the ELF both insular and easy prey for counter-propaganda from all sides. As 
far as Ethiopia was concerned, the ELF’s large Islamic support base was proof 
that the Eritrean insurgency belonged among Arab-led plots to turn the African 
Horn to Islam or at least strip off Ethiopia’s Christian identity and traditions. 
From within the nationalist movement, ELF social practices were labeled “back-
ward” and “archaic” and more inclined toward ethnicity and regionalism than 
to the emergent Eritrean nation. Public discourse was also couched in loud, 
sharp terms to mirror ELF-EPLF competition in the 1970s (see Gebre-Medhin, 
1976: 60; 1982/1983; 1989: 182–188; Tseggai, 1976; 1988). All of this left the 
ELF in a vicious circle in which its identity parameters stoked fear mongering 
by Ethiopia, which, in turn, created a climate that cost the ELF support from 
within Eritrea and the West. 
The campaign was reconfigured against this background. To avoid potential 
dysfunction caused by religious interests, the EPLF built on the supra-religious 
postulates in Nehnan elamanan and eventually supported a strategic de-linking 
of religion from political society (Makki, 1996: 483; Pool, 1998: 21). From 
the mid-1970s, ethno-confessional and socio-economic differences, efforts to 
transcend them or at least contain their impact on inter-group relations, or the 
apparent lack of such commitment would all signify a new left-right ideological 
divide in the nationalist movement. In this framework, the ELF was a zealous 
prisoner to regional history and sub-national interests, unwilling to accept on 
equal terms the highland Christians who had swollen its ranks from the mid-
1960s, yet unable to articulate requisite changes to push forward the struggle. In 
contrast, the EPLF had “successfully transcended parochial divisions and narrow 
agendas” (Iyob, 1995: 122) or spoke to and/or embodied a corporatist unity of 
the nation, the revolution, and the vanguard (cf. Pool, 1998: 20; on corporatism, 
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see Nyang’oro & Shaw, 1989). 
Other observers have depicted the EPLF in more precise terms. Swayed 
largely by its centralized structure and radical public rhetoric, analysts of 
gender relations, land reform, and the social sector generally have seen the 
EPLF as Marxist, as well as radical enough to seek an overturn of society 
(see Wilson, 1991; Magos, 1981; Gebre-Medhin, 1982/1983; 1989; Silkin, 1983; 
Sherman, 1978; 1980; cf. Johnson, 1981). In the Challenge road: Women and 
the eritrean revolution, for example, Wilson (1991: 55–56, 132) suggested 
that individuals, families, and “all … other identities” faced collapse in areas 
under EPLF control. This was a result of the EPLF’s careful mix of efforts to 
institute Gramscian “auto-reflection” by individuals, with generous support for 
oppressed groups. According to Wilson (1991: 116; cf. Silkin, 1983: 912–913), 
the EPLF’s immediate goals were less to create a socialist society than to “destroy 
feudal forms of production” leading to “a fundamental transformation which 
both enables and secures social and ideological changes.” Hence, peasants who 
had waged lifelong battles with the landed gentry and women resisting male 
domination flocked to EPLF. This spoke as much to the EPLF’s egalitarian 
promise as it did the ELF’s “ethnic chauvinism” (Wilson, 1991: 90–91). 
The EPLF had shown great potential. However, Wilson may have read too 
much social capital accumulation and/or altruism into what was a shrewd strat-
egy for self-preservation. As Pateman (1990a: 471) noted, egalitarian practices 
“proved to be the most effective way of attracting and keeping the loyalty of 
[EPLF] supporters, and, in general, of organizing a revolution.” But beyond 
that survival instinct, not much seemed sacrosanct. Thus, despite its claims on 
gender equality, no women sat on the EPLF’s governing council until 1987. 
Upon the election of women to the Central Committee in March of that year, 
General Secretary Isaias Afeworki voiced his desire that the six new female 
members would approach their new role “not as women” (1987: 28, italics 
added). In an apparent insight on the EPLF’s lack of action on gender rhetoric, 
Afeworki hinted at a shortage of suitable female candidates. Gender could not 
be so urgent when so much was yet “to be done to create competent cadres 
who can shoulder responsibility at Central Committee level … instead of hav-
ing a symbolic representation.” Is “real” representation gender-free and should it 
be? Or is social class gender-blind? 
The answers could go either way. Meanwhile, female members of EPLF 
politburo needed to deny their natural selves to partake in their own liberation. 
At the least, they had to accept male-inclined constructions of their place in 
the EPLF. Despite this patronizing situation, Afeworki’s riposte on gender had 
deep resonance in an organization long used to obeisance from its members and 
affiliates. The “national unions” of women, youths, and peasants – to cite but 
the most obvious examples – had been remarkably instrumental in their mobi-
lization. However, the core value of such constituents lay in how they helped 
reduce the EPLF’s transaction costs (and much less so those of the ELF) by 
their access to scarce materials and symbolic resources based in “civil society” 
(NUEW, 1985; cf. Iyob, 1995: 128ff.). The question therefore is whether the 
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popular, egalitarian, and corporatist slants of EPLF programs would (or could) 
last beyond the insurgency. 
Corporatism is not synonymous with socialism. EPLF spokespersons also 
often denied the group’s socialist leanings (Pliny the Middle-aged, 1978: 44). 
Gebre-Medhin (1984) argued that the socialist slant of the National Democratic 
Program, enunciated in 1977, set the EPLF apart from the ELF; however, the 
distinction became worn thin in the 1980s (EPLF, 1977; 1987). In 1984 while 
he was Assistant General Secretary, Afeworki had acknowledged that the EPLF 
preferred “the general socialist trend” in the Third World, but he offered no 
details (Firebrace & Holland, 1984: 131). Three years later when he took the 
top post, Afeworki stated categorically that a future Eritrean state “will face 
difficulties in giving a house to everybody”; hence, it must allow “people to 
have some kind of private property” (Afeworki, 1987: 25; cf. Kaplan, 1988: 65; 
Connell, 1993: 23–25). 
The lesson is that ideological claims are a poor gauge of an organization’s 
character. In Eritrea, each front continued to self-aggrandize among its “pronounced 
regional clientele and orbit of operation” (Young, 1983: 220) while playing at 
the proverbial “civilizing mission” with regard to the other Front’s constituency. 
Eritrea-wide considerations also did not necessarily take precedence over (or for 
that matter displace) the Fronts’ respective outlooks and preferences (Harnet, 
1983/1984: 9–11; Markakis, 1988: 52–53; Araya, 1990: 89–91). Observers 
appeared to have been so charmed by the Fronts’ various rhetoric on social 
matters and by their military successes in the 1970s that they missed the impor-
tance of such descriptive terms as “incorporation,” “co-optation,” and “organizing” 
that recurred in the Fronts’ literature (cf. Styan, 1996; Pateman, 1990 [1998]; 
and Pool, 1998).
In retrospect, the ELF was less adept in politicking. Its leaders not only 
failed to notice declining support for the imperial order on the Eritrean plateau; 
they also could not exploit subsequent shifts in allegiances in the former union-
ist heartland. From the early 1960s, political groups in the highlands began 
to see their perceived influence on the Addis Ababa government diminish; the 
imposition of Amharic as official language also entailed “enforced assimilation 
and repression of culture” (Cliffe, 1989: 136). These and other sources of 
political alienation in the highlands drew Christians to the ELF. Yet, until 1969, 
the ELF did very little to “integrate” the new recruits or to adjust existing 
structures and procedures in view of its expanded social bases (Markakis, 1988: 
58; Pool, 1980: 34). Increased guerilla activity helped transform a once small, 
“hidden war” into a full-fledged rebellion; it also jolted long-held perceptions of 
imperial Ethiopia in the West. 
Notwithstanding, ELF leaders were increasingly unable to articulate the strug-
gle in their own terms or to sway the wider discourse in its wake.(8) Challenged 
by younger, “well educated, often ideologically radical, and mainly Christian 
elements” (Young, 1983: 216), the ELF establishment resorted to traditional tac-
tics to re-assert its authority. Dissident groups sought to maximize their growing 
bargaining power; at various times they refused to alter their position, stalled at 
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reconciliation, or altered the criteria to suit their needs. With the ELF reacting 
in kind, a seemingly innocuous quarrel over social and military strategy soon 
produced a clear fissure in the movement (Harnet, 1983/1984: 8–10; cf. Pliny 
the Middle-aged, 1978: 38f). 
Attempts by the ELF to crush dissidence or neutralize its proponents now 
seem counterproductive, but this does not mean that they were unusual. 
Power does not itself self-destruct; only power-holders do. Power-wielders are 
also likely to agree to co-opt new demands rather than to dilute (or, worse 
still, change) their organization’s identity parameters.(9) In conditions of weak 
institutionalization, new demands could create pressure points that could in turn 
undermine the authority of leaders and/or the social order. Or they could foster 
a climate of social inertia, produce recurrent struggles for supremacy, and/or 
create cycles of renewal and decay. In this context, the ELF’s lag behind the 
EPLF spoke to the “murky and complex political situation” in Eritrea through-
out the 1970s (Pliny the Middle-aged, 1978: 37n); to high stakes in the then-
uncertain future of the liberation campaign; and to sharp differences of vision 
and strategy between the Fronts. Other groups were not immune from the same 
pressures; but even those that had become cynical about the “civil war” joined 
to build pressure on both Fronts for a rapprochement. 
COLLAPSE OF LOCAL CYNICISM
The quest for a détente during the 1970s centered on three main factors. The 
first was the desire by ELF leaders to retain hands-on control of the nation-
making process. The logic of this quest is as follows. The insurgency had 
resulted “from [the] anger of coastal Tigrai Muslims at being coerced into 
an essentially Amharic Christian unitary state” (Young, 1983: 220). The ELF 
was the natural home for these initiators. However, early signals from outside 
the lowlands were ambiguous. There were hints that any payoffs from the 
initial fights could be watered down or eroded wholesale. To pre-empt such 
developments and keep with the ideals of the insurgency’s founding fathers, the 
argument went, the ELF needed to provide the leadership for the campaign. 
Such ideas were not free from criticism. Arab support for the ELF, or 
propaganda arising from such support, did not endear the ELF to all. Among 
highland elites, a secular Eritrea was an irreducible minimum, but few would 
have trusted the ELF to bring such a state into being. For many, an Eritrean 
state run according to Islamic precepts portended a cultural backlash against 
Christians or the loss of Christians’ putative socio-economic advantage. 
Memories of ELF bias during the 1960s both heightened such fears and made 
the prospect of political control from Addis Ababa a less frightening option 
among Eritrea’s highlanders (Geremay, 1971: 26). Rapprochement between the 
ELF and EPLF was also unattractive. 
Ethiopia was the third factor in the quest for détente. Dramatic changes had 
taken place in the 1970s, but these changes ensured Ethiopia’s place in the 
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making of voix Érythrée rather than weakened it. Before his overthrow, the 
Emperor Haile Selassie had long exploited Eritrea’s internal cleavages (Markakis, 
1987: 121ff, 144–145; Negash, 1997: 148–153; Iyob, 1995: 101–107). After long 
casting the ELF as a fringe body in search of a lost cause, the imperial regime 
had from the late 1960s combined violent repression in rural Eritrea with a 
“hearts-and-minds program” in urban centers (Bell, 1974: 433, 443; cf. Hanson, 
1969: 4; Selassie, 1980: 66–67; Giorgis, 1989: 81–84; Markakis, 1987: 118–
119). The military committee known as the Dergue (Amharic for “committee”) 
that followed Selassie had, by 1975, squandered much of the political capital 
accrued from turning the country away from imperial-era divide-and-conquer 
practices; the Dergue later re-invented itself as a Marxist-socialist régime. 
Ethiopia’s new ideology helped free long-idle political capital in the region 
and redirect it into new mobilization strategies. However, it also made ELF-style 
gradualism passé and raised the stakes for parallel identities in Eritrea. Attempts 
to run what Young (1983: 216; cf. Pool 1998: 30) called “an embryonic state” 
in Eritrea’s liberated zones were far-reaching,(10) but highlighted miniscule rather 
than real differences between the ELF and EPLF. As Lobban (1976: 342; cf. 
Harnet, 1983/1984: 10–15) argued, there was more “slogan and rhetoric” than 
“substantive differences” between the Fronts’ platforms; for Sherman (1980: 49
–54), the EPLF was “proactive” while the ELF was “reactive.” Logic dictates 
that EPLF “innovations” may have been “reactions” to ELF adventures, includ-
ing its mistakes (cf. Harnet, 1983/1984: 10). From the late 1970s, both fronts 
looked to Ethiopia for rhetoric as well as policy initiatives. 
The same doctrine set Ethiopia back and cost it Eritreans’ support. In a bid 
to strengthen their hold on power, elements of the Dergue instituted or at least 
plotted a campaign to eliminate radical intellectuals and student leaders in Addis 
Ababa (Clapham, 1988: 51–57, 204–208). The regime’s slogan, ityopia tikdem 
(lit. Ethiopia first), also implied a territorial vision of Ethiopia that was at odds 
with its initial claims on internal self-determination. With a command economy 
and matching rhetoric in place, Ethiopia soon played host to a wave of populist 
nationalism. The ensuing “revolution” undermined the social-status aspirations 
of the petty bourgeois and middle classes; it also made victims of Eritreans 
in the public services and the professions (Giorgis, 1989: 86; Araya, 1990: 
97f; Woldemikael, 1991: 38–39). Following attacks on Asmara by both Fronts 
and by Ethiopian forces in early 1975, Selassie noted (1980: 67; cf. Clapham, 
1988: 59), “the armed struggle, which had been confined to the lowlands and 
to the northern and southern mountains, now reached the gates of Asmara and 
reverberated throughout [Eritrea], involving the entire population.” 
In the 16 months leading up to April 1978, according to the EPLF, “27 mem-
bers of the EPLF led Association of Eritrean Students were killed, 70 arrested 
and 1443 were forced to leave Asmara for the field” (EPLF, 1982: 211; italics 
added). The Ethiopian counter-insurgency strategies had backfired dramatically. 
Not only had the Dergue’s practices deepened anti-Ethiopian feeling in Eritrea, 
they had helped stir up cross-cultural support for a campaign long weighed 
down by a seemingly parochial slant. The seismic change erupted mainly from 
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highland Christians, among them public servants, self-employed professionals, 
and entrepreneurs who had not been opposed to the Eritrean cause per se but 
appeared to have been torn between tacit support for Ethiopian rule and a 
cynical indifference to the ELF (Chaliand, 1978: 126–128; Cliffe, 1989: 138; 
Selassie, 1993). The book, A Painful Season & A Stubborn hope (Tesfagiorgis, 
1992), a personal narrative on the Eritrea campaign from the perspective of 
a highland elite, is set in this context. The story begins in early 1975, after 
attacks on Asmara forced many to take definite sides. 
The attacks had prompted a joint response by the ELF and EPLF that rattled 
the Dergue forces. Both Fronts opted to reject the autonomy offer from Addis 
Ababa and instead push for no less than a sovereign Eritrea (Lobban, 1976: 
343).(11) The rare meeting of minds by the Fronts meant, in turn, that Eritreans 
could no longer sit on the fence. Thus, many elites newly estranged from the 
Dergue’s Ethiopia signed up to join the Fronts in combat or other roles; others 
went into exile or moved back and forth between roles. Émigrés supported the 
campaign in various ways. Many helped raise cash and other resources; some 
helped build on the Marxist-Leninist discourses (Young, 1983: 216); and a few 
discounted ideology to sell the liberationist paradigm in the West (Kaplan, 1988: 
62). 
The best known advocates of voix Érythrée came from the émigré community 
and include Asmarom Legesse, Amare Tekle, Araia Tseggai, and Gaim Kebreab 
– all holders of Ph.D. degrees with substantial publications and public service 
to their credit.(12) Another influential voix Érythrée proponent was Kassahun 
Checole, an academic-turned-publisher. His Red Sea/Africa World Press, which 
he founded while in exile in the United States, issued much of the material 
on Eritrea. The most influential proponent may have been Bereket Habte 
Selassie, a jurist who became Attorney General in Imperial Ethiopia at age 29 
and served as Mayor of Harar in the east. After a short stint with the Dergue, 
Selassie migrated to the United States in the 1970s. From this new base, he 
worked as an EPLF observer at the UN; as roving ambassador for insurgent 
Eritrea; and as professor of law and international politics at Howard University. 
Selassie became the preeminent elder statesman of Eritrean studies in the West 
and helped put Eritrea at the center of a new liberationist discourse on Africa 
and the world. 
EMERGENCE OF Voix ÉrythrÉe 
At its advent in 1978, voix Érythrée rested on three waves of commentary. 
The first consisted of work published from about 1969 to 1975 that brought 
news of the war in Eritrea to the world. Most reports highlighted the height-
ened guerilla attacks on economic targets (e.g., railways) or visible regime sym-
bols such Ethiopian Airlines’ aircraft, as well as reprisal attacks in rural Eritrea 
since about 1967. The risk of wider disorder in the Horn and in the Middle 
East soon after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war also loomed large in the analyses. 
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Contributors in this group labored under standard assumptions of international 
relations and state concerns, and as such they tended to look in at Eritrea from 
the outside. Thus, the crisis was depicted as endemic and the insurgency as 
“troublesome” (Campbell, 1970; Bell, 1974); other phrasing included “rebellion,” 
“hidden war,” and plain “fighting” (Geremay, 1971; Hanson, 1969; Halliday, 
1971; Abir, 1972; Robbs, 1975). 
Other than Bell, whose views I have discussed above, most commentators 
stopped short of painting a psycho-cultural profile of Eritrean Moslems or of 
the campaign. However, many seemed to take Ethiopia’s boundaries for granted. 
Africa’s oldest indigenous state had come to mean so much that questions 
regarding the expansionist slant of its Eritrea policy went unasked. Of course, 
there were a few exceptions. Op-ed pieces in the leftist quarterly tricontinental 
(1969: 30) called attention to the danger of “Ethiopian colonialism,” but rows 
over ideology meant that such views reached only a restricted audience in the 
West. Hanson (1969) depicted the United States and Ethiopia as “the new colo-
nialists”; in turn, Robinson (1971) pointed to the “blatant” African-style internal 
colonialism underway in Eritrea. Robinson also inspired a view that observers 
looking out from Eritrea would call “Ethiopian-internalist,” which is described 
further below. In general, the 1960 reports had a bias towards Ethiopia. This 
preference likely reflects Ethiopia’s deft moves in diplomatic circuits during the 
period but also the much weaker and ineffectual Eritrean propaganda in the 
West. 
The second wave of commentary emerged around 1976. This wave sought to 
raise and project Eritrea’s own voices in lands far and near, and centered on “the 
case for Eritrean national independence” (Tseggai, 1976). Araia Tseggai was 
the first Eritrean intellectual to make the nationalist case in a Western scholarly 
journal, the Black Scholar, during the period under review.(13) Three months 
later, in September 1976, the Monthly review published a similar account by 
Yordanos Gebre-Medhin (1976). Both authors sought to disassemble existing 
theories of the insurgency and pushed Eritrea’s case by affirming the historical, 
political, and legal bases of its claims against Ethiopia. At this stage, the ELF 
and EPLF had few apparent differences and few were seeking to define sharper 
distinctions between the two. Ethiopia’s military regime was still taking shape 
as of 1975; hopes of a political settlement of the Eritrea problem were high, 
and Marxism-Leninism had yet to become the doctrine of choice in the region. 
Yet, change was imminent. Both the ELF and EPLF soon took on Marxist 
garb, and analyses took on new theoretical and rhetorical flourishes. 
Voix Érythrée came into its own in 1978 with the launch of the third wave 
of commentary. The swift passage from the second wave reflected changes in 
intellectual, military, and political aspects of the campaign. Politically, the EPLF 
had just fallen out with Osman Sabbe’s ELF-PLF. Relations between the EPLF 
and the larger ELF had been tense. At the same time, Ethiopia was flush with 
its victory over Somalia in the Ogaden and had wasted no time in exploiting 
ELF-EPLF schisms. Ethiopia launched a new offensive in 1977–78 that forced 
Eritrean forces into “strategic retreat,” a euphemism for the loss of liberated 
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towns. The ELF lost the most ground, making it more prone to internal splits 
and pressure from the EPLF. Such weaknesses would prove terminal to ELF 
military capabilities in Eritrea and hasten its othering in discourse. 
Meanwhile, the intellectual sphere was also experiencing some discord. Early 
in 1978 a new journal called the horn of Africa was launched with the goal 
of bringing “a genuine conciliation” in the horn region, including between 
Ethiopians and Eritreans, by airing “as many arguments on as many sides of 
a given issue as there are people willing to declare themselves” (Ali, 1978: 3). 
From April 1978, the journal started publishing numerous articles on Eritrea 
(Selassie, 1978; Fessehatzion, 1978; Sherman, 1978; Bhardwaj, 1979; Voice, 
1979; see also Heiden, 1978). Two Eritrean émigré intellectuals, Kassahun 
Checole and Tekie Fessehatzion, became contributing editors to horn of Africa 
around this time. The journal’s association with Eritrean intellectuals as well 
as the slant of the material it published attracted comment. From Holland, the 
EPRP (1981: 49) wrote to criticize the horn for “beautifying certain fronts 
while attacking others”; and for giving prominence to writers who, in EPRP’ s 
view, were “notorious for their blind adherence to the line and propaganda of 
the EPLF and TPLF.” 
The EPRP’s comment followed closely after some criticism from within. In 
an editorial, the horn’s Special Correspondents (1981: 7, probably including 
Dan Connell) acknowledged that, in effect, they might have helped reinforce 
some myths about the region. Their reports on the refugee situation in the 
horn, they went on, had “at times [been] impressionistic and … lacking in 
certain necessary hard information.” The editorial might have been a confession 
of sins or a plea for more verifiable research procedures. But it did make a 
case for a shrewd skepticism on the part of observers of the Horn. To the same 
extent, the reflective mood at the horn spoke to the increasing analytic angle in 
work on Eritrea since 1980 (e.g., Markarkis, 1981; Selassie, 1980; Magos, 1981; 
Checole, 1983a; 1983b). 
Voix ÉrythrÉe: AN OVERVIEW 
Three main attributes of the field stand out. First, more of the early output 
appeared in established leftist or new, left-inclined journals than in the main-
stream media. This trend reflected residual Western perceptions of Eritrean “sep-
aratism” as well as the ideological slant of early discourse. The tricontinental, 
a journal based in Havana, Cuba, published statements rebutting claims that 
Eritrea’s was a case of “secession” but such arguments were suspect in the 
West. The quarrels would draw in more mainstream media as well as observ-
ers. For example, there are interesting parallels to be drawn between Bell’s 
(1974: 429n) skeptical views on Halliday (1971), and Rentmeesters (1982) 
critique of Halliday and Molyneux’s the ethiopian revolution.  
Second, most Eritrean observers tried to advance the nationalist cause; 
however, each work stood alone with regard to substance as well as its analytic 
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thrust. The earliest efforts were more general and inductive, while subsequent 
work was empirical-deductive. Nonetheless, few provided any new information 
on ELF activism during the 1960s. Selassie’s Conflict and Intervention in 
the horn of Africa (1980) was a bold attempt at constructing the conceptual 
and theoretical building blocks of nationalist discourse in the region. Yet as 
Markakis (1981: 366) noted, the analysis drew far too little from Selassie’s 
inside knowledge of the functioning of the imperial court. Selassie filled some 
of the gaps in riding the Whirlwind (1993), but in a form that intertwines 
fact with flights of fictional fancy. As Samantar (1997) showed, this strategy is 
shrewd but it can leave a reader puzzled. 
This leads us to the third defining attribute. Voix Érythrée had begun with 
a greater inclination toward intellectual activism than academic practice.(14) Its 
central founding task was to justify EPLF choice objectives, strategies, and tac-
tics, more than to promote open-ended debate. As part of this goal, the EPLF 
published a handful of in-house newsletters and magazines, such as Liberation 
issued by the Association of Eritrean Students in North America (AESNA), 
Adulis, and eritrea information, a monthly bulletin issued by the Research and 
Information Center on Eritrea (RICE), then a clearinghouse for data collected 
largely by EPLF Research and Public Administration units. 
The position and role of RICE expanded considerably over time. It helped 
feed EPLF values and data into research-based analysis of the insurgency, and 
issued or prepared material for publication. With its main office then in Rome 
(Italy), and with branches in major capitals around the world, RICE(15) was well 
primed to influence international opinion on Eritrea. RICE helped arrange visits 
to nationalist base areas by scholars and journalists from around the world. It 
also forged informal alliances with activists and non-governmental organizations 
concerned with the effects of drought and dislocation on civilian populations. 
The reports and essays informed by organized trips to Eritrea, as well as by 
other forms of “information streaming,” reinforced EPLF positions directly 
and indirectly. For instance, RICE had prepared the eritrean Case (Permanent 
Peoples’ Tribunal, 1982) from proceedings of the Tribunal’s session on Eritrea 
held in Italy in May 1980. The Rome session offered a platform for collabora-
tion by scholars and activists from across the world that shared an interest in 
Eritrea’s cause, but the Tribunal’s opinion may not have had much weight, a 
suggestion I will return to shortly. 
Among the analytic imprints in the RICE series is the Journal of eritrean 
Studies, based at Michigan State University in the United States. Araia Tseggai, 
its editor, doubled as RICE Director/Coordinator for North America during the 
1980s; in turn, the journal served as a vent for the nationalist fascination with 
“facts” and the provenance of facts. As Tseggai (1986a: v) wrote, the journal’s 
mission was to “rectify perceived distorted information” about Eritrean history, 
society, and economy. Thus, in addition to articles and book reviews, the 
journal published nationalist analyses of declassified archival material as well as 
other documents obtained under the United States Freedom of Information Act. 
The best illustrations of the wider reach and scholarly inclination of the 
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RICE-EPLF alliance are two volumes published nearly one decade apart. The 
first is Behind the War in eritrea (Davidson et al., 1980), which was a product 
of an international symposium organized by the British charity War on Want 
and held in London in early 1979. The volume’s ten essays do have a distinct 
pro-EPLF slant, however. This reflects the kind of information available to 
contributors and the fact that Bereket Selassie, the sole Eritrean contributor to 
the volume, had initiated the symposium. In April 1984, War on Want and the 
British Labor Party set up a trip to Eritrea for Firebrace and Holland. The title 
of their report, Never Kneel Down (1984), is drawn from a well-known EPLF 
allegory. The report of a subsequent delegation was published four years later 
as eritrea: images of War and Peace (Kinnock, 1988). 
The second collection is the Long Struggle of eritrea, also edited by Cliffe 
and Davidson (1988a). Seven of its nine substantive essays are by non-Eritrean 
writers, activists, and scholars, a hint that Eritrea’s foot soldiers were drawn 
from around the world. However, the veracity of the findings is debatable. For 
example, the editors aver that the “character and qualifications of [the] authors 
… made [the Long Struggle] a work of critical inspection and analysis, not 
of propaganda value for one cause or another” (Cliffe & Davidson, 1988: 7). 
Elsewhere in the volume, Cliffe (1988: 88) made a point about being asked by 
the EPLF, in its letter inviting his contribution, to appraise (read, “compare”) 
the EPLF’s performance as well as international responses in policy areas. In 
short, the editors sought to preempt possible charges of EPLF bias; Cliffe also 
implied that the EPLF had been so open-minded or at least self-assured as to 
initiate critical assessment by “uninvolved” outsiders. These claims are not only 
valid but also offer some evidence of a replicable research process. 
However, the reality was far more complex. Eritrea’s policy sphere was not 
limitless. The EPLF that had voiced its favor for objective opinion had long 
cornered the field; by the mid-1980s, it had become Eritrea’s single dominant 
policy actor. Certainly, the contributors to the Long Struggle were not EPLF 
ideologues or ELF sympathizers; but they also could not have missed the 
EPLF’s rising politico-military stature since the late 1970s (Cliffe, 1984; cf. 
Medhanie, 1989: 49–65). the Long Struggle makes EPLF positions the basic 
norm of Eritrean national aspirations, and its critique of EPLF was far more 
instrumental than may be initially apparent. 
In different respects, the eritrean Case and the Long Struggle represent 
both ends of a large body of literature founded on diverse intellectual traditions, 
but with straightforward parameters. In addition to Front imprints, the main 
output included several doctoral dissertations by Eritreans (e.g., Tseggai, 1981; 
Yohannes, 1986; Stefanos, 1989; Gayim, 1993) and a large number of shorter 
essays. However, few of the latter appeared in leading Africanist journals. In the 
approximately three decades until 1990, the African Studies review, issued by 
the African Studies Association in the United States, published no full article or 
even a book review on Eritrea, with the exception of Pateman’s review (1987) 
of Erlich’s book, ethiopia and the Challenge of independence.(16) The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, published in the United Kingdom since 1963, had 
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a better record of publishing work on Eritrea than did African Studies review. 
However, both pale compared to review of African Political economy, a leftist 
journal published in Britain since 1974. As Keller (1990/1991: 133; 1991: 8
–9) has argued, Eritrea’s case was in the “consciousness of progressive move-
ments” around the world, but it was featured only intermittently, if at all, in 
mainstream and popular media in Africa and elsewhere. 
Eritrea did get its message across to the world, however. A small band of 
intellectual activists and foot soldiers relatively unconstrained by geography 
and political doctrine made up the front line. Their ranks comprised two main 
groups: Eritrean exiles in the West whose numbers increased steadily since the 
late 1970s, and foreign observers, writers, and scholars. Some of the latter also 
held domestic anti-establishment views, while many had principled opposition 
to an international system controlled unfairly by a few Western countries. Some 
also were sympathetic to the particulars of the Eritrea case. 
The “community” of Eritrean scholars, writers, and researchers invariably 
agreed that Eritrea had suffered dreadful historical and political wrongs and that 
the world had stood by or even conspired in this injustice, uncaring toward 
people who did not have powerful patrons. The theoretical and analytical 
framework of this view includes three principal elements: 
a) denied or aborted decolonization (Selassie, 1989; Yohannes, 1987)
b) international laws and conventions on the right to self-determination 
(Davidson et al., 1980; Selassie, 1983; Babu, 1988; Fenet, 1988; Gayim, 
1993)
c) a revolution by oppressed peoples seeking auto-centric social change along 
classic Marxist-Leninist lines (Gebre-Medhin, 1989).
Africa as a whole was used in this calculus, although often incorrectly. 
From the point of view of Eritrean insurgents, the post-colonial order in Africa 
embodied all that was wrong with Ethiopia (Yohannes, 1987: 657–662; Babu, 
1988: 49–51; cf. Ekpo, 1975). The decisions made by Eritrea’s liberation move-
ments, however, ultimately rested on the specific question and condition of 
Eritrea, and their movement was the first on the continent to seek state division 
and the creation of a new, independent state.
The analyses also contained a certain legal-institutional moralism. The formal 
slant has been scrutinized in detail using UN legal codes and other principles 
of jurisprudence (Selassie, 1989). The moral idea has taken various forms. Some 
pilloried the UN as a remorseless co-plotter against small Eritrea, neglecting to 
note the “federation” debacle of the 1950s. Others depicted Eritrea as a helpless 
victim of power plays (Yohannes, 1991; Pateman, 1990/1991). The result has 
been to make theory and analysis in Eritrean studies normative, well ahead of 
the praxis of the day; otherwise Eritrea’s preferences have been sold “as is,” a 
package that other actors must accept without reservation. 
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Occasionally, analysts have failed to account for conflicting pressures within 
large and diverse agencies such as the UN. For example, (Pateman, 1990/1991: 
33) condemned “apparent duplicity, special pleading and complicity on the part 
of the United Nations,” yet he then appeared to look up to international orga-
nizations for instilling a change in attitudes on Eritrea. In similar terms, Fenet 
(1988: 33) noted that the “advisory opinion” on Eritrea issued by the Permanent 
Peoples’ Tribunal in May 1980 had gone unheeded by Ethiopia. The UN, of 
course, sometimes lacks power to enforce its rulings. However, the Peoples’ 
Tribunal had no authority, and no state was obligated to note its opinion, much 
less heed it. 
In other cases, the engagement with facts was far from inter-subjective, and 
claims were made based on facts that were difficult to verify. Asmara and 
other towns in Eritrea were long under Ethiopian occupation, and the physical 
safety of observers and travelers could not be ensured in rural areas. Because 
researchers were unable to gather their own data, their analyses reflected either 
the views of the Ethiopian government or information provided by the Fronts. 
Given the ELF-EPLF conflict in the realm of ideas, observers had no option 
but to draw on earlier information or on partisan or publicity material. Checole 
(1981/1982) judged Sherman’s (1980) Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution useful 
but “disappointing” for these reasons. Taddia (1988) applied much of the same 
criticism to Firebrace and Holland’s Never Kneel Down, as did Keller (1990) to 
Gebre-Mehdin’s Peasants and Nationalism in eritrea. 
DYADIC FRAMES OF ANALYSIS
The Eritrea debate is replete with dyadic schemes that have deep roots 
and have spawned simplistic discourses. In a review of the first edition of 
Pateman’s eritrea: even the Stones are Burning, Amare Tekle (1991a) identi-
fied three main strands in the debate. The “Ethio-centric” school encompassed 
prominent defenders of “Greater Ethiopia” such as the Pankhursts, Ullendorff, 
and Rubenson, and scholars (e.g., Keller, Markakis) who seemed ambivalent 
about the nature of the imperial state. The fine distinctions apart, all were 
Ethiopianists (or “Internalists” in Tekle’s phrasing) who had not accepted the 
liberationist view. Tekle called the second group “Globalists.” Leading figures 
included Haggai Erlich and Paul Henze, those who had worn Cold War lenses 
while looking at Eritrea, and proffered solutions that favored either superpower. 
In effect, the Globalists denied Eritrea its interests. 
The third group can be called “Eritro-centric.” Its ranks included Eritrean 
and foreign scholars and activists whose work straddled Ethiopian as well 
as Eritrean positions and sought to rectify imbalances in the historiography. 
Pateman, Richard Sherman, Bereket Selassie, and Araia Tseggai are included in 
this category, and Tekle (1991a: 72) absolved them all from “misrepresentations 
made by others.” In my view, that is a caveat to justify Tekle’s exclusion 
from the list of scholars well known for being less “fervent partisan(s) of 
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Eritrean liberation.” (Young, 1983: 231) Two such scholars are Mesfin Araya 
and Tekeste Negash, both Eritreans with Ph.D. degrees. Tesfatsion Medhanie 
is another, but he had ELF sympathies. In any case, Tekle’s classification has 
deep implications. It sets up a dyad between advocates of insurgent Eritrea and 
others. It draws the same line among Eritrean nationals, and thereby reinforces 
the insider-outsider dichotomy in Eritrean studies. 
The literature furnishes three main variations on the dyadic theme. Popular 
(or perhaps populist) versions are long on righteousness and unity of purpose, 
such as by the use of the possessive pronouns we and our. However, they are 
short on substance and tend to deny the multiple divergences in social construc-
tions of Eritrea. Lloyd Ellingson, a historian of British Eritrea, critiqued one 
such work (1985: 73): the eritrean Case by the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal 
(1982): 
the case for Eritrea has not been furthered by the publication of [the 
eritrean Case], which rather than accurately and objectively expose the 
facts further obfuscates the issues that so desperately need explanation. In 
general, the vocabulary strongly suggests the writers have a political ax 
to grind, and Eritrea’s cause has been ungraciously used as their vehicle. 
Those who know little about Eritrea will not find their knowledge greatly 
increased by reading this book, and they are likely to be turned away 
from any further investigation of an issue deserving more friendly and 
intelligent reporting. 
In turn eritrea: Miracleland (Ghebrai, 1993) is a personal account that makes 
no claim to standard methods or rules on evidence. Nonetheless, Ghebrai’s 
definitions of friend and foe are too black and white to be useful. Her style 
also raises questions whether Eritreans had waged war against the conquest 
state in Ethiopia or its citizens and if a future Eritrean government would ever 
contemplate détente with Ethiopia. The answer to the latter had always been an 
emphatic yes; hence, methods such as Ghebrai’s add less value than they might 
seem. 
A second variety of the dyadic frame blends research with “vivid reportage.” 
The results give the impression of history being written as it unfolds. The 
authors appear to be aware of – or defensive about – the biases of their data 
and the limited generalizations such data can support. Hence, they stop short of 
pushing particular meanings too strongly. Dan Connell (1993 [1997]: 6, 32–33, 
42, 80–81) and Basil Davidson (1988: 189) can be included in this category. 
Both are acute observers and benign critics of Eritrea. Their criticism and its 
forms explain, in part, why, to quote a distinguished scholar (anonymous), 
Eritreans had been so “starry-eyed” throughout the 1980s.(17) Both also lay 
beneath the self-applause in the historiography (cf. Gilkes, 1991; Markakis, 
1998). 
The final strand of the dyadic scheme has some of the rigor of solid 
academic work. Most essays in the Long Struggle (Cliffe & Davidson, 1988a) 
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belong in this grouping, as does the book eritrea: even the Stones are Burning 
(Pateman, 1990). The latter has a second edition and it is a form of the 
“official chronicle.” Yet, its author’s interpretations usually spring from a more 
or less extensive literature review as well as some crosschecking of official 
data (Pateman, 1990 [1998]: xx). That said, Pateman’s has not always been 
disinterested commentary. In an earlier work, Pateman (1986: 25; 1990 [1998]: 
97) intoned on the “carpet bagging, Amhara Christians who [had] descended on 
Eritrea to occupy the most profitable bureaucratic, business, and administrative 
positions.” This does no more than operationalize colonialism in base terms. 
But parallels do exist in the none-too-veiled name-calling directed at several 
colleagues on the other side of the Eritrea debate (e.g., Pateman, 1990 [1998]: 
x, xii). 
For dispassion within the dyadic frame, The eritrean Struggle for 
independence (Iyob, 1995) is a good resource. Iyob’s political sympathies are 
not in doubt, but her book offers a blend of discourse analysis and historical 
narrative; it opens on a celebratory note but dwells on the dark intrigues and 
dramas of Eritrea’s odyssey since the 1940s. Styan (1996b: 615) suggested 
that Iyob’s focus on Ethiopia’s imperial ambitions meant that she glossed over 
the EPLF’s hegemonic aspirations. That is true, but another problem lies in 
the dichotomous logic of liberationist analysis. In Eritrean studies, as in the 
stimulus-response models brought forth by American behaviorists in the 1960s, 
dyadic schemes have tended to deny an inclusive middle, the gray space that 
incorporates object whims and externalities, where lofty dreams meet with hard-
nosed reality and where cognition can – and often does – confront ingrained 
belief. 
VANGUARD THEORIES
Peasants and Nationalism in eritrea (Gebre-Mehdin, 1989) is perhaps the 
most ideological academic treatise published on Eritrea during the 1980s. The 
study of the peasant’s place in social revolutions includes two distinct elements. 
One is a critique of Western scholarship on the horn, especially the use of 
anthropology to support Ethiopia’s claims on Eritrea. The other element suggests 
a near perfect fit between Leninist and Maoist theories and the Eritrean revolu-
tion under the EPLF. For Gebre-Medhin (1989: 182–188; 1984; 1982/1983), this 
background foreclosed on elitist reforms in Eritrea. What was in process, then, 
was a movement from below to create a new society, built up from the ashes 
of the old society. 
To be sure, the urban elite had retained considerable influence for various 
reasons. According to Gebre-Medhin (1984: 50), “peasant – based revolutions 
are always historically limited – backward looking, localised, fragmented and 
short-sighted.” Class-consciousness among the Eritrean working class was also 
far too weak to support a revolution led by one of their number. Above all, the “more 
conscious” petty bourgeoisie had “a vital interest in independence” (Harnet, 
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1983/1984: 4). The reasons for such interest can include a desire (or need) to 
spread the benefits of social progress, support the poor, or pursue some narrow 
group goal(s). 
Gebre-Medhin argued, however, that the Eritrean petty bourgeoisie had 
committed class suicide. In a bid to travel the same road as their comrades in 
Amilcar Cabral’s African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC), 
the EPLF elite had renounced their “natural” claims to status and privilege. 
As such, EPLF elites were the ultimate guarantors of a “democratic solidarity” 
between peasants and workers. By virtue of this “pact,” peasants had not only 
ceded “leadership” of the revolution to workers. Other classes and groupings 
had joined in the revolution, creating support that cut across the economic and 
social hierarchies of the ancien regime. Meanwhile, class contradictions that 
might emerge during the liberation campaign would be resolved in the course 
of Eritrea’s transition to socialism. 
The inference from Gebre-Medhin’s argument is clear. Class suicide by some 
petty-bourgeois elements is indispensable to successful revolution. However, a 
closer look might suggest that the petty bourgeoisie embraced revolutions to 
maintain their social identity, not to lose it. True class suicide can appear to 
blur class and socio-economic divisions; in times of social flux, appearance and 
the reality might seem like two sides of the same coin. In the final analysis, 
though, the structures and processes of revolution, including agenda setting and 
mobilization, would usually reinforce elite control, not diminish it. Real power 
is hardly ever passed on to the general populace. 
Moreover, the conditions favoring revolutionary programs may differ from 
revolutionary outcomes; progression from one to the other is neither linear nor 
inevitable (Johnson, 1981). In insurgent Eritrea, land reform had lured Kebbesa 
(highland) peasants to the EPLF, not ideology in and of itself. In return, the 
EPLF had taken control of substantial material resources and undercut its politi-
cal foes, including the nobility, clergy, and ELF (cf. Gebre-Medhin, 1984: 53
–55; Cliffe, 1989: 144–145). There is no reason to believe, however, that the 
quid pro quo can outlive a war. Most, if not all, land reform programs have 
created new privileges as well as inequities, and history is replete with cases 
of revolutionary elites turned state managers, leaving, in the words of Powelson 
and Stock (1990), the “peasant betrayed.” 
There are many implications for policy and practice in Eritrea. As the 
Johnsons (1981: 194–195) insisted, the real test of the EPLF’s commitment 
“to build a people’s revolution from below” lay not in the “logic of protracted 
struggle,” important though this was. Rather, it depended on whether the EPLF 
could construct a “non-hierarchical and democratic” society post liberation. Such 
an accomplishment would require an “associational form of socialism [that] can 
not be guaranteed in an independent Eritrea.” Regardless of claims to the con-
trary, the EPLF had no control over the historical moment of Marxism and land 
reform in Eritrea. Both reflected a mix of internal and external considerations. 
However, the past is no guarantee of the future. “Human behavior,” Eritrean 
President Afeworki (1994: 3) once stated in a speech commemorating the armed 
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struggle, “differs in times of war and peace.” The moralities and practices of 
peacetime can upend the codes of insurgent life. Above all, revolutions make 
elites far less than elites make revolutions; self-preservation is as central to elite 
impulses as the prospects for progress are to loyalty from the masses. 
OTHER ANALYTIC FRAMES
The foregoing conclusions have resonated in contexts from development 
strategy to blends of fact and fiction. towards Asmara (Keneally, 1989) is an 
example of the latter. It is a tale of incredible human suffering and resolve 
that tracks sure-footed movements from narrow nationalisms to a uniform 
political platform in Eritrea. towards Asmara espouses official discourses of the 
campaign and distills EPLF views. It also glosses over difficult choices between 
ends and means and mixes fictional strategy and history so seamlessly that few 
readers must wonder if its discourses create, or only mirror, “reality.” Sorensen 
(1991a: 76) asked whether Keneally’s narratives of the “perfect revolution” 
were mere morality tales or hints that Eritrea’s revolution really did or could 
yet symbolize “flawless perfection.” Because images do acquire their own life-
worlds, Sorensen argued, those in towards Asmara could throw up symbolic 
burdens that Eritrea might find difficult to bear – or shake off – in real life. 
Many of the same burdens give shape to riding the Whirlwind by Bereket 
Selassie (1993), another tale of the twists and turns of revolution set in 
Ethiopia. In one of the many critical points in the story, Desta, the idealistic 
academic and narrator, concedes that revolutionary leaders can become self-
destructive “cop-out(s).” Desta’s down-to-earth admission followed an ill-
tempered discussion at a Paris café. In the course of debate, his compatriots 
express sharply opposing views on how rising personal expectations might 
cause shifts in group interests after the revolution. Concluding this episode, 
Mekonnen, a self-conscious assimilado and doctoral candidate in law, declares 
matter-of-factly (Selassie, 1993: 257–258, italics in original): 
The subject cannot be exhausted in one afternoon. But the bottom line 
is: nobody acts selflessly, even when he pretends to do so. At heart we 
are all selfish. Let’s face it, comrades. The revolution is a lie. You are 
all living a lie!”
It was a cruel parting shot which stunned us. “What would we gain 
by becoming revolutionaries, do you think?” Haile asked calmly. Nothing 
ruffled Haile.
[Mekonnen responded, also unperturbed.] Power, of course. It is obvi-
ous. You are interested in power, but you are not honest enough to say 
so. You wrap yourselves in the ideology about the right of the masses. 
C’est la vérité. I know you hate me for saying so, but it is the truth. If 
you can bring some good for everybody with the least harm, you have 
my blessing, for what it is worth. But history teaches us that revolutions 
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invariably do needless harm. I am not prepared to give my support to 
needless harm. 
Mekonnen’s pun may or may not have been intended, but his position is sim-
ilar to Ikem Oshodi’s in Anthills of the Savannah (Achebe, 1987). A newspaper 
editor in the fictional state of Kanga, Oshodi chooses a tense student gathering 
to parody Marxist precepts. The “dictatorship of parasites,” he proclaims cyni-
cally, was the antidote to society’s afflictions. Ethiopia, of course, differs from 
Nigeria, the putative setting for Anthills, however, the blocked aspirations and 
political entrepreneurship featured in the discourse related to both societies. 
The wider point is that all politics is a purposive activity founded on differ-
ent mixes of personal and group interests. The alternative discourse in Peasants 
and Nationalism in eritrea, it follows, is no less Western or open to criticism 
of the motives and values of scholars and political gladiators. It is only more 
amenable to interpretation(s) of theory and history that favored Eritrea’s then 
current position(s) and repudiated Ethiopia’s claims to the same extent. Professor 
Gebre-Medhin may or may not have revised his views on elite “selflessness” 
in light of Eritrean statehood. Undoubtedly, however, the portrait of life in 
post-revolutionary Ethiopia in riding the Whirlwind invited Eritreans to behold 
their future – and to rethink this vision while they still had the opportunity to 
change it.  
The mix of forms and substance feature no less prominently in other works. 
Gayim (1993) examined from a legal perspective why state actors often put 
their desire for state hegemony (read, “self-preservation”) before the peoples’ 
right to self-determination. The problem is pertinent, but Gayim defines it in 
such a way that his findings are academic vis-à-vis institutional practices at the 
UN. Conversely, the Struggle over eritrea (Erlich, 1983), or the debate in its 
wake, suggests why belief must not trump hard data when the subject under 
study is still unfolding. Erlich’s views on the future of the Eritrea campaign 
were pessimistic and seemingly cast in stone. But the situation turned around 
soon after Erlich’s work was published (Rees, 1984; Ellingson, 1986). 
Araia Tseggai (1981; 1986b; 1987) has worked on infrastructure development 
in modern Eritrea. From a desire to refute the economic arguments employed 
by the British to oppose statehood in Eritrea in the 1940s, he advanced a 
theory of economies of scale in small states. Tseggai (1983; 1991; 1994) never 
denied that state size and natural resources matter, only that the resources 
themselves impede economic development. “Small,” Tseggai (1994) argued, “can 
be a blessing” as it offers lower cost per capita for infrastructure construction 
and makes for structural flexibility vis-à-vis export markets. A small country, 
he insisted, is also unlikely to develop grandiose tastes. The sheer scarcity 
of resources narrows the options; the choice and design of optimal economic 
policy as well as development strategies may also be much easier than in a 
more auspicious setting. 
At first glance, Tseggai’s arguments are axiomatic. History unfolds as human-
ity creates virtue from necessity, as embodied greatly by self-reliance in Eritrea. 
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The question, though, is whether virtue must be constructed only on one’s terms 
and what difference external settings make. Clearly, Tseggai’s theory does not 
fully account for externalities or for wider constraints on the choices open to 
state actors. A small and resource-poor country is not a large consumer market; 
it is less able to absorb shocks from economic and trade cycles, or to manage 
external constraints. In a world that turns on the dictates of multinationals and 
supranationals, the policy instruments of a small state can only go so far. Even 
more pointed is whether Eritrea’s self-reliance strategy can remain in place after 
the war ethos that long energized it has diminished. On this issue, and on a 
development strategy for an Eritrea that seeks full relations with the world, the 
EPLF’s “clear ideological line” had offered little or no guidance. The picture 
Bereketeab (2000: 196) painted of an ELF stretched so thin by fighting that 
it could not plan for the future may be correct, but it also applies across the 
board. Despite its long grip on power, and much like Guinea-Bissau’s PAIGC 
(Lopes, 1987: 71), the EPLF had not thought through to a post-liberation state 
in Eritrea. 
CONCLUSION
Eritrea was the first nation in post-colonial Africa to make the passage from 
imagined nation to full-fledged statehood. Young (1983) analyzed two contem-
poraneous cases: Katanga (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Biafra (Nigeria). 
However, in both cases, the issues were “resolved” without a change in the 
map. However, those in Eritrea who first raised the banner against the old 
order and its subaltern identities lost out. Their views were pushed off the stage 
before the campaign reached its finale. There are some parallels with uprisings 
in Uganda and Nigeria, although Eritrea has a longer history of insurrection. 
In their scope, as well as depth, the intellectual aspects of Eritrea’s campaign 
also set it apart. Nationalist campaigns may or may not create their own tailor-
made discourse; Eritrea’s, however, required new discourse and information. 
Eritrea had been exposed to a succession of external interests; with ingrained 
concepts of “self” and “other,” some Eritreans wished for independence as 
early as the 1940s. The problem, however, was two-fold. First, Eritrea’s social 
formations had developed differential visions of nationalism over time. The 
social divisions that followed in the wake of British rule were real and stymied 
nation-making for decades to come. Second, the regular use of concepts such 
as colonization, de-colonization, and self-determination seemed to offer Eritreans 
more of the same sort of thinking and conditions. Concepts needed rethink-
ing to sharpen the edge of Eritrea’s case. In the early- to mid-1970s, a new 
coalition of intellectual and politico-military interests emerged, and, with it, an 
expansive knowledge-production program as well as an army of foot soldiers 
primed to sell Eritrea’s nationalist cause across the world. 
Voix Érythrée, as I have discussed in this article, embodies this new think-
ing. Its origins lay in disparate responses in Eritrea to the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
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federation, the ensuing splits in the nationalist movement in the 1960s, and the 
fierce contest for the minds of Eritreans as well as friends of Eritrea around the 
world. As a body of thought, voix Érythrée sought to project the EPLF and its 
values. Over time, voix Érythrée espoused a unity of society and the vanguard; 
it also made the EPLF and Eritrea seem like the two sides of the same coin, 
effectively excluding the ELF and externalizing ELF and non-EPLF interests as 
“others.” 
The biases of voix Érythrée escaped scholarly attention for at least three 
reasons. First, privileging the war’s outcomes over its processes lent an external 
orientation to liberationist analysis. Looking inwards in a situation such as 
Eritrea’s would have seemed like a pointless diversion from the core tasks of a 
campaign against occupation. Second, the social situation in Eritrea had reduced 
the opportunity cost of such concerns. Support for the liberation agenda had 
expanded slowly but steadily, cutting across ethnic and class boundaries. By 
the mid-1970s, splits in nationalist ranks had merely slowed down the fighting, 
not undermined support for the wider campaign. Finally, the collapse of ELF’s 
military presence in Eritrea in 1981 left the EPLF free to map the terrain as it 
saw fit, without direct oversight by the opposition. 
The result was at least twofold. First, the quid pro quo arrangement that 
began in the late 1970s between Eritrean insurgency leaders and the campaign’s 
intellectual foot soldiers around the world deepened. The former was left in 
charge of domestic politics and diplomatic matters, while the latter devised and 
ran hearts-and-minds programs at the international stage. Following closely was 
a dramatic expansion in the ranks of Eritrea advocates, both indigenous and 
foreign, and improvements in the liberationist paradigm and output. Thus, voix 
Érythrée became a sort of brand name on the global stage as the war began 
its third decade. Among the more influential works on contemporary Eritrea are 
some of those published since 1980. 
In the quest for a political kingdom, Eritrea’s advocates focused on the 
defects of the institutional-legal status quo in the UN state-based system. But 
these were by definition normative, part of a vision of world order after the 
Second World War. In effect, Eritrea’s liberationist critique raised the level of 
discourse and blurred the boundaries between experience and hope. By doing 
so, it encouraged its protagonists to deny that social and political changes 
are slow, incremental, and uncertain, and to gloss over the specificity of key 
moments in the insurgent campaign. The result is an irony of sorts. Nearly all 
Eritrea advocates agree that its experience has been unique. In other words, the 
identity paradigms acclaimed in the literature mirror the experiences and condi-
tions that created them. However, the advocates also hint that wartime practices 
can be divorced from their historical moment(s), or at least that a change in 
Eritrea’s circumstances will not induce a break with its insurgency traditions. 
So what does the future hold? In my view voix Érythrée will decompose in 
parts and be reconstituted; change is the one sure thing in the social realm. As 
nation-building gives way to state-building in Eritrea, the bounded rationality 
as well as the heroism of the war will recede from direct experience to history 
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and memory. What Makki (1996: 475–478) called the “horizontal comradeship” 
and local solidarity networks of the EPLF will compete – or at least share 
space – with the structures and hierarchies that come with a modern state. An 
army without symbols of rank and privilege might not be a bad idea but would 
be pointless, as would Eritrea’s emergence into the world without an opening 
up of domestic conditions. In short, sovereign Eritrea must learn to abandon 
the “liberties” afforded during times of war by meeting its peoples’ collective 
desires and tapping into its resources. The new state can draw down the cul-
tural capital of insurgency for only so long.
Of the many pressures driving change, three are at the forefront. Foremost is 
the division of labor between Eritrea-based military-politicians and intellectuals 
who were part of the diaspora. This “buffer zone” has helped manage conflict 
by keeping apart the two main wings of the Eritrean elite. The value of this 
divide is sure to diminish, as the war did not leave Eritrea with a philosopher-
king or cult-of-personality leader who could indefinitely hold the support of 
the masses. Revolutionary Guinea-Bissau had a theoretician/gladiator in Amilcar 
Cabral, while post-apartheid South Africa had Nelson Mandela, an elder, legend-
ary statesman with a strong moral voice with which to lead the post-apartheid 
era. Émigré Eritreans helped to make the voix, but it is not clear that they 
have become folk heroes in their homeland or have gained political capital. 
Many regard Isaias Afeworki as a brilliant military strategist and statesman, but 
few will compare him with Cabral much less Mandela. Above all, the ELF’s 
situation throughout the 1980s might be a sore point, stalling shifts in interna-
tional perceptions of Afeworki and the domestic image of émigrés. Eritreans 
and friends of Eritrea are likely to train their sights less on the symbolism of 
the now rested armed struggle than on its returns. 
The second pressure point follows closely on the heels of the first. A 
redefinition of roles between the elite and the masses, and among the elites, 
is likely to draw on and in turn redraw the balance between universalism and 
relativism. Voix Érythrée had long emphasized both: the Eritrea debate is empty 
without its appeal to universal principles of humanity and international law on 
one hand, and the imperatives of its experiences on the other. However, the 
discourse always seemed skewed in favor of the specifics. Now, the habits of 
a modern state will affect ordered existence in Eritrea. The substance of such 
new life, how and in what forms it is or is not expressed, and what it means 
for relevant groups, will encourage a fresh look at the liberationist discourse. 
Without the bounds imposed by war, it will cost less to draw on wider criteria 
to show the limits of the discourse. In this process, it is likely that Eritrea will 
be compared with its African neighbors, including Ethiopia. 
Finally, the social composition of Eritreanists will remain a touchstone of 
post-liberation discourse, but might become a double-edged sword in Eritrea’s 
state-making effort. A political superstructure built on the ethos of both insur-
gency and liberalism helped Eritrea wage and win a war. Will such a structure 
fare as well in a free Eritrea? It is very early yet, but many Eritrean exiles 
and friends of Eritrea in the West may see the end of armed struggle as a new 
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beginning, when new structures and strategies can be tried. After long espous-
ing the voix and, in effect, speaking for the EPLF, many Eritrean exiles might 
now push for reforms of state, economy, and society in Eritrea. Generations 
of tegadelti (freedom fighters) will bring their viewpoints to the public domain 
too, as will civilians, most of who stayed in Eritrea throughout the war. A 
values conflict between local and diaspora Eritreans may be far-fetched, but the 
émigrés are likely to find much to recommend in the socio-economic models of 
the West. For the same reasons, the émigrés’ values might not blend seamlessly 
with those that have long informed the praxis in Eritrea. Divergent visions of 
the future might well require increased political management. The imaginations 
of self and other in Eritrea will change yet again, with the ebbs and flow of 
power. 
NOTES
(1)  Work on this article occurred in various phases, first in 1996–98 when I lived and 
worked in Eritrea, then early in 2001 during a short visit, and intermittently since. 
Thus, the essay draws on my direct experiences and impressions of Eritrea and from 
my meetings and discussions with a cross-section of Eritrean society, including some 
of the actors mentioned in the text. I have tried to reflect these diverse sources in the 
analysis, but I also chose not to attribute much of my field data so as not to breach 
informant confidences. I acknowledge, with thanks, all of the individuals, groups, and 
institutions that offered their time, funds, or other forms of support for my research. 
The list includes, but is not limited to, friends, students, colleagues, and respondents 
in Eritrea and among Eritreans of the diaspora; the Rockefeller African Humanities 
Institute, the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute and the Department of Afro-American Studies 
(all at Harvard University, Cambridge, USA); and the Program on Forced Migrations 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, also in Cambridge, USA. Last, but by no 
means least, I thank anonymous reviewers for their useful input. Of course, I alone am 
responsible for the views expressed here. 
(2)  A probable exception is Sorensen’s work (1991b), which contrasts Eritrean and Ethio-
pian identity discourses. However, this line of inquiry is not pursued in the present 
essay. 
(3)  See Woolgar (1989) for an examination of the agent’s roles in an active-passive, 
initiation-consolidation continuum,. 
(4)  Here, I present a caveat. During the 1940s, Wolde-ab Woldemariam (1905–95), the first 
indigenous editor of the British-sponsored, Tigrinya-language eritrean Weekly News 
who later founded another journal titled hanty eritrea (lit. United Eritrea), published 
well-reasoned articles on practically all matters Eritrean, including folklore, identity, 
and political aspirations. However, Woldemariam’s articles were more popular “nation-
founding” narratives than analytic statements. Widely recognized as the “father of 
modern Eritrea,” he also was a late convert to Eritrean independence and wrote mainly 
during the period outside the present essay’s timeframe. Recently, Nicole Saulsberry 
(2001) completed a Ph.D. dissertation on Woldemariam’s life and times at Stanford 
University, USA. 
(5)  During the 1990s, zemheret Yohannes was Chief of Cultural Affairs at PFDJ Central 
Office; he also served for a short while as Eritrea’s Acting Minister of Information.
(6)  Pool (1998: 23n; cf. Gebre-Medhin, 1984; Cliffe, 1989: 145) conceded that his initial 
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argument had been “static”; ELF-EPLF relations, Pool later argued, are much too com-
plex to be understood by simple contrasts drawn between their respective social bases 
and contexts. 
(7)  Shifta originally referred to small, mobile militias that had championed early, loosely 
organized resistance to British rule in Eritrea. Over time, the concept has acquired 
contemptuous connotations; authority figures have used it to compare freedom fighters 
with gunmen driven more by a thirst for vengeance killings and criminality than by 
political ideals. 
(8)  As late as the mid-2001, websites run by Eritrean Islamic Jihad [www.eijm.org], the 
Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council [www.meskerem.net], and Repre-
sentatives of the Kunama People at Home and Abroad [www.ndh.net] appeared far 
less adroit at handling Eritrean news and viewpoints than, for instance, www.visafric.
com and www.dehai.org. No less sophisticated than the last two sites were www.awate.
com and www.asmarino.com; however, both operated largely on the fringes of official 
Eritrea and were more likely be a springboard for, or even promote, independent view-
points. 
(9)  On the EPLF’s handling of the “internal crisis,” see Iyob (1995: 116–117) and Pool 
(1998: 25–26). 
(10)  The rationale for such efforts was multi-sided. The Fronts had built social support and 
what Makki (1996: 477) called a “substitutionist political culture” by offering material 
provisions and/or “functional civil government in the rural areas where the ‘imperial’ 
civil administration [had] been unable and unwilling to provide the simplest services” 
(Hanson 1969: 3; Heiden, 1978: 17). 
(11)  However, the debate on the peace formulae continued until the 1980s; those included 
in the process were some who had helped build the federal structure of the 1950s. See 
Davidson (1988), Pateman (1990b; 1991a; 1991b), Keller (1991), Tekle (1989; 1991b), 
Medhanie (1994b), and Scholler (1994).
(12)  (a) Asmarom Legesse trained in anthropology at Harvard and worked at Boston 
University and Northwestern University, among others. He was chair of the Eritrean 
Relief Committee in the United States (1984–91) and Academic Vice President at the 
University of Asmara in 1995–96. In 1998, he became leader of Citizens for Peace in 
Eritrea, a campaign group collecting and documenting information on the estimated 
75,000 ethnic Eritreans deported from Ethiopia beginning in June 1998. 
 (b) In his Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Denver in the United States, Amare 
Tekle (1964) made the case for union between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This might seem 
puzzling in light of developments in Eritrea since the 1980s, yet Amare’s research 
mirrored the opinions of the elite in Eritrea’s highlands until the mid-1970s. Following 
a career in the Ethiopian Foreign Service, Dr. Tekle spent some time as an academic in 
the United States. In 1991, he became chair of the Eritrean Referendum Commission, 
the body that organized the vote that ushered in independence in May 1993. He also 
served as a member of the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea. Prior to May 1998, he 
was on a committee charged with drafting the electoral code. In 1999, he was named 
Diplomatic and Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President of Eritrea. 
  (c) Araia Tseggai earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Nebraska, 
Lincoln, with a dissertation entitled “The economic viability of independent Eritrea” 
(1981). As Director of the Research and Information Center on Eritrea in North Amer-
ica, Dr. Tseggai served as editor of its Journal of eritrean Studies; he also founded 
and edited the horn review, a short-lived independent journal. After 1991, he became 
President of the University of Asmara and served for a short while as Vice Minister of 
Finance and as Governor of the (Central) Bank of Eritrea before becoming founding 
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General Manager of the Housing and Commerce Bank of Eritrea. 
 (d) Gaim Kibreab has probably been the most influential Eritrean voice in refugee stud-
ies. Dr. Kibreab, once also a refugee, trained in anthropology in Sweden and authored 
several empirical studies of Eritrean refugees, especially those in the Sudan. He has 
taught at the Open University and at the South Bank University in London. 
(13)  Confirmed in a conversation with the author in January 2001.
(14)  It is necessary to distinguish between “intellectual activists” and “academic practi-
tioners” as they relate to Eritrean liberationist discourse. Intellectual activists are, to 
appropriate Young’s words (1983: 231), the “fervent partisan(s) of Eritrean liberation”: 
participants, observers, writers, and scholars alike who sought to sustain or change 
the attitudes and opinions of relevant groups in favor of insurgent Eritrea. Academic 
practitioners are, on the other hand, participants and connoisseurs of the Eritrea debate, 
both scholars and non-scholars, for whom Eritrea was less a primary campaign or 
advocacy issue than a professional academic or free standing “other” focal subject. The 
categories are, of course, not mutually exclusive; many in the Eritrean intelligentsia 
and non-Eritreans who had joined in the campaign for political, ideological, or other 
reasons straddled the boundaries, or moved back and forth between these positions. 
Overall, however, intellectual activists likely found the threshold much less difficult to 
cross than did academic observers. 
(15)  RICE’s local counterpart since independence, the Research and Documentation Center 
(RDC), is part of Eritrea’s Ministry of Information and Culture. 
(16)  A computer search (by subject) of African Studies review’s online index for 1958–
90 yielded no single article focusing on Eritrea. This contrasts sharply with the many 
articles on Ethiopia. 
 See http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/ASA/index_subj1.html. 
(17)  Anonymous source; the conversation took place in Eritrea in 1997. 
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